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PAVtNIK'S THEORY OF LEGAL DECISIONMAKING:
AN INTRODUCTION
Louis E. Wolcher
Marijan Pav6nik, whose essay on legal decisionmaking appears in
this volume,' teaches at the law school of the University of Ljubljana, in
the Republic of Slovenia. Slovenia's status as an independent nation
dates back only to 1991, when it successfully broke away from the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia following a brief armed
struggle.2 Professor Pavnik is one of the most prolific and interesting of
those academics from the formerly communist states of Central and
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. Marijan Pav~nik, Legal Decisionmaking as a Responsible IntellectualActivity: A Continental
Point of View, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 481 (1997).
2. The Republic of Slovenia is a geographically small nation of two million people. Located in
the heart of Europe, it is bordered on the west by Italy, on the north by Austria, on the east by
Hungary, and on the south by Croatia. Under Habsburg domination from the thirteenth century
through the end of the First World War, Slovene lands became part of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes (the "first Yugoslavia") in 1918, a state of affairs that lasted until the invasion
and occupation of Slovenia by the Italians and the Germans during the Second World War. Sergij
Vilfan et al., The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia 13-26 (Miro Cerar ed. & Toby
Robertson et al. trans., 1995). Shortly after the war, Slovenia was integrated into the Socialist
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (the "second Yugoslavia"). Id at 27. With the collapse of
the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s, and amidst a deepening economic crisis and the intensification
of ethnic antagonism within Yugoslavia, in 1990 the Slovene Assembly authorized a popular
referendum on independence. More than nine out of ten eligible voters turned out for this
referendum, which was held on December 23, 1990, and 88.2% voted in favor of independence. On
the basis of this vote, Slovenia declared itself a sovereign state on June 25, 1991, and there
followed a ten-day war in which the Yugoslav army failed to prevent it from securing its
independence. The Serbian interpretation of these events is that Slovenia seceded from the second
Yugoslavia; another interpretation is that the second Yugoslavia was decomposed. In any case,
after widespread international recognition of Slovenia's independence in 1991 and 1992, the
country was admitted to the United Nations as a sovereign state on May 22, 1992. Id. at 30.
On December 23, 1991, the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted a new constitution for
the fledgling nation. Id. The text emerged out of a formal process conducted under the auspices of
an official "Constitutional Commission.' It originated with an outline prepared by a group of
intellectuals who had been politically opposed to the old regime, and the subsequent drafting
process included widespread public comment and debate as well as the involvement of an "expert
group" comprised of prominent legal experts and law professors. Miro Cerar, The Shaping of
Constitutional Institutions in the Republic ofSlovenia 10-11 (Nov. 1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Washington Law Review). The new constitution declares Slovenia to be a "democratic
republic," a "state governed by the rule of law," and a "social state." Slovn. Const. pt. I, arts. 1, 2,
translated in Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia 15 (Miro Cerar & Janez Kranjc eds., Sherrill
O'Connor-.raj & Garry Moore trans., 1993). It also affirms Slovenia's obligation to protect
"human rights and fundamental freedoms" within its territory. Slovn. Const. pt. I, art. 5.
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Eastern Europe who are currently writing on topics germane to legal
philosophy. I had the privilege of co-teaching two classes with him at
the University of Ljubljana in the fall of 1996-one on legal theory and
the other on the philosophy of law-and in the course of our
collaboration I acquired a great deal of respect for both the man and his
work. The editors of the Washington Law Review, having had the
excellent judgment to want to publish his essay, have asked me to
furnish this introduction for the benefit of those who may find
themselves feeling uncertain about the import of Professor Pav~nik's
ideas, or the context in which they were developed.
At the end of his essay, Professor Pav~nik succinctly summarizes his
thesis by stating that legal decisionmaking, and the decision that is its
endpoint, "are always responsible human acts, ones that create law in the
fullest sense of the word."3 According to him, legal decisionmakers-
and especially judges-are responsible in two different senses. At one
level, they are responsible to the audience of their decisions (to the
parties, to other judges, to the public, etcetera), and the criterion of their
having discharged this responsibility is the audience's acceptance or
rejection of the decision's premises and its resulting conclusion.
Responsibility in this sense entails the kind of constraint on
decisionmaking that Duncan Kennedy calls "double objectivity":4
namely, the decisionmaker's knowledge not only that the legal text
expresses a rule that she is not free to ignore, but also that others will
view her decision through the lens of conventional attitudes and beliefs
concerning the range of choices that are legitimately available to her.
The feeling of responsibility that this knowledge can instill in a
decisionmaker may be compared to the feeling of social pressure that
comes from our fearing that others will view us in a poor light if we do
something that falls outside the range of what is generally thought
proper. But over and above this meaning of the word "responsible,"
Professor Pav~nik also maintains in his essay that decisionmakers are
responsible in a deeper, more primordial sense. For it is the
decisionmaker, he contends-not the "statute," not the "intent of the
legislature," not anything or anyone else-who always does and must
bear responsibilityfor the creative act of interpretation that constitutes
her decision. The decisionmaker is the one who terminates the
3. Pav~nik, supra note 1, at 505.
4. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 .




indeterminacy of the legal text-a text that at first is always "open as to
its meaning" 5 -by weaving it just the way she does into the tapestry of
the case before her, rather than some other way.
Professor Pav~nik juxtaposes his account of decisionmaking with two
other theories, which he claims are descriptively less adequate: (1) the
naive but persistent and widely held view that legal decisionmaking
consists in the mechanical application, to the facts of the case, of a
meaning that is pre-given, and that somehow already resides "in" legal
rules as texts ("conceptual jurisprudence");6 and (2) the more
sophisticated conception, first developed by Adolf Merkl and then
refined and popularized by Hans Kelsen, that decisionmakers construct
the meaning of a rule, specific to their task at hand, out of earlier
interpretations that assigned the rule a meaning residing at a somewhat
higher level of generality (the "theory of graduality of legal norms").7
Situating his own thesis within the tradition of a discourse that is known
in the civil law as the "theory of argumentation," Professor Pavnik
maintains, against both of these theories, that the legal decision as such
is "a value synthesis assessing the normative starting point with regard
to the factual starting point, and vice versa."' Conceptual jurisprudence
errs by representing decisionmakers as uncreative law-applying
automatons. And while the theory of law graduality correctly attributes
creativity to decisionmakers, it too errs by imagining that their creativity
begins and ends within the domain of abstract legal norms. According to
Professor Pav~nik, the legal decisionmaker is best understood as
someone who creatively and simultaneously constructs the law out of the
facts of the case, and the facts of the case out of the law.
And how, it might be asked, could anyone ever manage to do both of
these things at the same time? Here Professor Pavnik's thesis relies on,
and presupposes an understanding of, the concept of "dialectical
reasoning." Although it may be natural for lawyers trained in the
common law tradition to think of the categories "law" and "facts of the
case" as being interdependent and separated by a boundary that is fuzzy
at best,9 we common lawyers are somewhat less likely than our civilian
S. Pavdnik, supra note 1, at 493.
6. Id at 487-488.
7. Id at 488-490.
8. Id at 481.
9. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal
Problems, in Lon L. Fuller, The Problems ofJurisprudence 653 (1949).
Cook notes that in all systems of common-law pleading,
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counterparts to be familiar with the formal concept of dialectical
reasoning. Accordingly, I offer a homely illustration of dialectics that is
meant to be useful in preparing the ground for the reception of Professor
Pav~nik's more sophisticated treatment of that concept in the context of
legal decisionmaking.
Imagine that you are walking in the park, and that you come upon a
small oblong object lying on the ground. At first glance it strikes you as
an oddity that is not quite like anything you have ever seen before. You
not only do not know what the object is made of, or why it is here, you
don't even know what to call it-indeed, if someone were to ask you to
tell them about the object, you probably wouldn't know what to say. But
now imagine that a group of children comes along. You see one of them
pick the thing up, and they begin to throw and bat it around from child to
child. Every now and then you hear them laughing and saying things like
"Good catch!" and "That's one point for you." It occurs to you that they
are playing a game with the object that looks rather like parts of other
games you have played or seen played-games like volleyball and
"catch." And now it strikes you, in a flash of insight, that the thing the
children are playing with really could be called a kind of ball. What you
have just done, to paraphrase Professor Pav6nik, is assess the object
(the factual starting point) with reference to the concept "ball" (the
normative starting point). On the other hand (you admit to yourself) you
have never before seen a ball that looks like this one: it seems oblong
like a football, but it is uneven and irregularly shaped; and you see, on
closer inspection, that its construction is a droll mixture of painted
cardboard and feathers. Still, both the thing and the way it is being used
seem to be provoking you, as it were, to classify it as a k!*nd of ball. So
you mentally index the word "ball" to provide a special conceptual niche
for irregularly-shaped, cardboard-and-feather "balls" like this one.
Indeed, if you were to see enough children on enough different
occasions playing with balls of this sort, you might even decide to give
them a special name-say, "cardfeather balls." What you havejust done
now, again to paraphrase Professor Pavdnik, is assess the concept
"ball" (the normative starting point) with reference to the object (the
factual starting point).
from every bundle of raw "facts"... data have necessarily been selected and then tied together
into bundles by means of statements or propositions in the formation of which rules of law
have been applied to the selected data .... [T]here is no logical or scientific distinction





Now imagine that the two things you have just done did not unfold
themselves in a neat temporal sequence, one after the other, but instead
wove themselves together in your experience in such a way that you
would be hard-pressed to say which came first, or which was more
prominent or important in the flux of events that made up your
engagement with the cardfeather ball. If you can imagine this, you will
begin to get a pretty good idea of what Professor Pav~nik is getting at
when he says that legal decisionmaking is a "value movement to-and-
fro" between the normative and factual states." What we lawyers know
as the "facts of a case"" is not the same as what laypeople sometimes
call "what really happened." For Professor Pav~nik, the expression of
the facts of a case is like a stalagmite that is built upwards from a set of
concrete and unique historical circumstances, involving just these
parties," but always according to the decisionmaker's perception that
the facts correspond to one or more (emerging) legal subcategories.
Likewise, the expression of what we call the "applicable rule"' 3 is like a
stalactite that is built downwards from a more abstract level of legal
norm, 4 and Professor Pavnik contends that it, in turn, is constructed
according to the decisionmaker's perception that the (emerging) facts of
the case correspond to a kind of conduct that is immanent in the more
abstract legal category. 5 Professor Pav~nik points out that the
decisionmaker constructs the two discourses-of fact and law-towards
one another; and that what started out as an "area of freedom"' 6 for the
decisionmaker always in the end gets filled up with her own
interpretations of the facts with reference to the law, and of the law with
10. Pav nik, supra note 1, at 496.
11. Professor Pavtnik calls these the "legally-relevant state of facts." Id at 483.
12. Professor Pavanik calls this set of circumstances the "life case." Id
13. Professor Pav~nik calls this the "normative state" or "normative state of constituent elements
of the case." Id.
14. Professor Pavenik calls this the "statute." Id.
15. For example, imagine the general rule "No smoking in class." Particular instances of
smoking-behavior may cause a decisionmaker applying this rule to articulate subcategories of
smoking that are prohibited by the rule, such as "cigar smoking" and "cigarette smoking." Now, if
someone were to light a stick of incense in class, this behavior (as a "life case") may or may not be
perceived by the decisionmaker as potentially governed by the categories and subcategories that
have been constructed heretofore out of the words "No smoking in class" (the "statute"). Suppose
that the decisionmaker does think the rule potentially applies. If Professor Pavdnik is right, she will
now articulate the facts-for example, "The defendant lit up a stick of incense, producing smoke,
but did not inhale it in the manner of a cigar or cigarette"-with reference to the rule ("No smoking
in class"); and she will express the meaning of the rule-for example, "the word 'smoking' in the
rule includes anything that smokes, whether or not it has been previously inhaled"--with reference
to the facts.
16. Pavnik, supra note 1, at 482.
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reference to the facts. Among other things, he is making the important
point that we radically distort the nature of the decisionmaking process
if we say that inert, prefactual law is applied "to" inert, prelegal facts, or
if we give causal primacy either to the facts as such or to the legal rule
as such. If all we care about is knowing the abstract truth concerning
which of these two "elements" of legal decisionmaking is more
important, perhaps it would be better for us to follow Hegel's epigram
that "the truth is in the whole,""7 and say that neither one is more
important than the other.
It is very clear, however, that Professor Pav~nik did not write his
essay merely to elucidate an abstract truth, or to defeat abstract untruths.
It is tempting to believe that because legal decisionmaking is an activity
that occurs in all legal systems, therefore the problem of legal
decisionmaking must be essentially the same everywhere. But believing
this would be a serious mistake. It would be wiser to ask: What is the
point of Professor Pavnik's project? What work was it meant to do?
Here it would be well to remember the truism that Professor Pav~nik's
essay, like anyone else's, develops its theme from within a particular
historical and cultural context. In this case, the context i; that of a law
professor in a newly independent nation that is, to borrow a phrase from
one of Professor Pavnik's colleagues at the University of Ljubljana,
"only just getting used to democratic order."" In a word, what many
American legal academics are inclined to see as a conceptual problem-
decisionmaking by judges who already have a sense of their own
institutional independence-Slovene legal scholars like Professor
Pav~nik are inclined to see as the beginning of a solution.
Coming to see legal decisionmaking as a problem or as a solution
frequently is a function of having had the experience of feeling puzzled
by it. And many people who think deeply about the law do eventually
get puzzled by what appears to be a conceptual gap between legal rules
and their application in concrete cases. Someone who is in the grip of
this puzzlement is inclined to ask questions of the following sort: How
could a mere graphic sign on a piece of paper-the inert expression of a
legal rule-have all of the consequences for people's lives and fortunes
17. Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy"
of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'y Rev. 571,587(1977).
18. Miro Cerar, Mechanisms of Direct Democracy in the New Slovene Legal and Political




that the law seems to have? Within the context of mainstream American
legal theory, the impression that there is a gap between the expression of
a legal rule and the act of applying it just this way, as opposed to some
other way, leads many people to worry that the Rule of Law is insecure.
The problem is not that there are "gaps in law" in the narrow sense of a
system of rules which, however clearly it seems to answer most
questions that are brought to it, still appears not to give an answer to the
question whether this or that particular act is prohibited or permitted. 9
The gap to which I refer here is seen to yawn in the midst of every act of
legal decisionmaking-in easy cases and hard-and may be described as
the puzzling absence of anything self-evidently there (other than the
decisionmaker) that would span the distance between legal texts thought
of as rules to be applied and what happens when those rules actually get
translated into deeds. Puzzlement about this gap can never be removed
by positing another, more particular, rule. It's not just that a more
particular rule might not be in existence yet, but that even if such a rule
does exist-for example, the rule that "Rule Xrequires that cases of type
A be decided for the plaintiff"-then between its graphic expression20
and its application to the case at hand will lie yet another gap: namely,
the gap from the phrase "cases of type A" to this case. In short, as
Professor Pav~nik's emphasis on the centrality of the "flesh-and-blood
decisionmaker" suggests,2 one can never close a conceptual gap of this
sort by laying down planks that always cover only half the remaining
distance to the other side.'
19. For an interesting discussion of "gaps in law" in this sense, see Marijan Pavdnik, Why
Discuss Gaps in the Law?, 9 Ratio Juris 72 (1996). There Professor Pavdnik brings up Hans
Kelsen's thesis that it is a logical impossibility for the legal order to contain a gap, because in the
moment of legal decisionmaking in concrete cases the legal order can always be applied, if only by
means of a "negative rule" to the effect that the defendant is not bound by the obligation that the
plaintiff alleges. Id Professor Pavliik confronts and takes issue with Kelsen's thesis by appealing
to what might be called an ethical difference between the law and the world: "The world does not
only consist of legally regulated areas and gaps in law that have to be filled. In the world there are
also legally empty (free) spaces eluding law and lawyers. In discussing gaps in law, we also discuss
man and his freedom." Id at 84.
20. And the graphic expression of any still more particular rule that you can imagine.
21. Pavenik, supra note 1, at 483.
22. What goes for rules also goes for any theory of decisionmaking that tries to intrude into legal
deciding itself. Without meaning to sound disrespectful to particular theorizers, or to theorizers in
general, the objection noted in text also pretty much disposes of the gap-closing aspirations of all
theories of legal decisionmaking that are offered to lawyers and judges as programs to be followed
in arriving at the correct applications of legal rules. For any theory of this kind, like a legal rule,
must express itself in signs, and between these signs and the application of the theory by the
decisionmaker there yawns the same old conceptual gap. See generally Stanley Fish, Doing What
Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies
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Now what really bothers many Americans who are puzzled by the gap
I have described-but who at the same time believe, with John Adams,
that the ideal of liberal democracy entails "a government of laws and not
of men"-' is just this: if the flesh-and-blood decider is taken to be the
sole logical "term," as it were, mediating between the legal-rule-as-sign
and this particular result, then there seems to be nothing to distinguish
what the law requires from what Duncan Kennedy calls the decider's
HIWTCO: "How I want to come out."24 The theory of judging displayed
in Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire comes to mind as an excellent
example of the kind of thing that legal philosophers who see this gap as
a problem are prone to think up." "It matters how judges decide cases,"
Dworkin writes, because "[p]eople often stand to gain o:7 lose more by
one judge's nod than they could by any general act cf Congress or
Parliament. 26 Dworkin's bite noire is a judge who is insufficiently
constrained by the law-a judge who, one has to suppose, has already
acquired a sufficient sense of her institutional independence from the
overtly "political" branches of government to feel frisky enough to enact
her own preferences (or someone else's) to fill up the gap between rule
and application. Whatever else can be said about it, Dworkin's theory of
"law as integrity"27 came into being in response to what might be called
the "problem of the independent judge" in historical and political
circumstances like those prevailing in the long-standing and well-
372-98 (1989) (making similar argument against programmatic aspirations of theory). Indeed, for
those who are deeply puzzled by the gap between a rule and its application, a theory of
decisionmaking in the programmatic sense always in the end takes on the aspect of just another
rule-a metarule, perhaps, but still just another bit of text lying on the table with all the other inert
signs that the decisionmaker feels obliged to apply to the case at hand.
23. John Adams, "Novanglus" papers, No. 7, 1774, in 4 Works of John Adams 106 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1851).
24. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 548.
25. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
26. Id. at 1.
27. Id. at 225-75. The concept of "law as integrity" is Dworkin's answer to conventionalism (the
thesis that law is and should be simply a backward-looking report of what judges have done in fact
in the cases they have decided) and pragmatic instrumentalism (the thesis that law is and should be
simply a forward-looking program of social betterment). His concept "insists that legal claims are
interpretive judgments and therefore combine backward- and forward-looking elements; they
interpret contemporary legal practice seen as an unfolding political narrative." Id at 225. His aim is
to inculcate the right "interpretive spirit" in decisionmakers-one in which they are inclined to lay
"principle over practice." Id. at 413. The point made in text is that Dworkin's project, whatever its
merits may be as a program for legal decisionmakers to follow, cf. supra note 22, is driven by
worries about what insufficiently constrained judges might do, and that this point of view for
looking at the problem of legal decisionmaking is historically situated and contingent.
Vol. 72:469, 1997
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established liberal democracies of the United States and Western
Europe.
In contrast, to Professor Pav~nik and the other legal scholars at the
University of Ljubljana who are laboring hard to construct the
conditions for a new democratic order in Slovenia, it must seem to be an
incredible luxury to have time to worry about dangers that are felt to be
posed by a strong and institutionally independent judiciary that is
insufficiently constrained by the law. During my stay in Ljubljana, I
never got the impression from my Slovene colleagues that the activities
of rogue judges were among those that were felt to be the source of the
problem that is referred to in Slovenia's Charter on Independence, which
states that the country from which Slovenia seceded, the former
Yugoslavia, "is not a state which observes the rule of law but rather
grossly violates human rights."'2 On the contrary, I was told repeatedly
that the real problem with the "rule of law" when the former Yugoslavia
was intact was the absence of judges and lawyers who were willing to
stand up to a repressive regime that was bent on stifling dissent and
securing obedience to its political programs. Hear what Professor
Pav~nik has written elsewhere of this period in his country's history:
In the Slovenian (Yugoslavian) constitution of 1974, basic [human]
rights were merged into a detailed vision of self-governing society
and state. The basic rights were designed as an element of an all-
embracing (and thus also totalitarian) self-governing system based
on the right of the working man and citizen to self-government.
The basic rights were not the starting point of the system, but only
a part thereof, and it was exactly determined beforehand how far
and where this part might be active. It is characteristic of this
system that it accepts the thesis of a pluralism of self-governing
interests but is not ready to institutionalize this plurality in a legal
and political manner.
Pluralism is only accepted up to a certain demarcation line not to
go beyond the system, whereas it seems suspicious and may lead to
criminal prosecution (cf. Art. 114 and 133 of the Federal Criminal
Code of Yugoslavia of 1976) as soon [as] doubts are expressed
about the system and changes are demanded.29
28. Slovn. Basic Const. Charter on Independence and Sovereignty, translated in Constitution of
the Republic of Slovenia 11 (Miro Cerar & Janez Kranjc eds., Sherrill O'Connor- raj & Garry
Moore trans., 1993).
29. Marjan Pavdnik, Understanding Basic (Human) Rights (On the Example of the Constitution
of the Republic ofSlovenia), 2 E. Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 41, 42 (1996). For a socio-economic critique
Washington Law Review
For more than four decades after the Second World War, lawyers and
judges in Yugoslavia were taught that they and the law were at best
marginally important to the social order. Yugoslav legal theory denied
the relevance of the bourgeois concepts of human rights and the rule of
law, and asserted the orthodox Marxist claim that the law and the state
should and would gradually wither away.3" As one of Professor
Pavnik's colleagues at the University of Ljubljana recently put it:
[Yugoslav] [llegal theory was thus predominantly occupied with
the idea of the establishment of a new self-regulative social order,
which resulted finally in the so called self-management system.
The paradox was that the state, led by the communist regime, did
not lose strength while, on the other hand, the law did. The status
and role of lawyers slowly lost any real significance, since the law
became or remained essentially subordinate to politics and the
regime. The consequences of that period are still apparent today,
especially within the legal administration and judiciary, whose role
within the legal order and society is still underestimated."
The same author goes on to state that "[p]ublic opinion [in Slovenia]
about the judiciary is predominantly negative," and attributes this in part
to "a collective memory of the communist regime," and in part to the
circumstance that many judges from the former regime still hold
office-a fact that the right-wing political parties in Slovenia's new
parliament have managed to keep constantly before the public eye.3"
When I was in Slovenia, I heard many similar reports from other
professors and students; they were usually delivered in a rueful tone of
voice, and were almost always accompanied by the expression of hope
for the coming of a change in people's attitudes about law and lawyers.
In short, within at least a large segment of the legal academic culture
there, the perceived problem with legal decisionmaking is the absence of
a strong feeling of professional independence and competence on the
part of lawyers and judges in Slovenia,33 and the presence of widespread
public mistrust of the legal system.34
of the Yugoslav self-management system, see Roberto Mangabeira Unger, What Should Legal
Analysis Become? 160-61 (1996).
30. See Miro Cerar, The Rule of Law ("Rechtsstaat'): The Case of Slovenia 16-17 (Nov. 21,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington Law Review).
31. L at 17.
32. Id. at23.
33. See id at 12.
[I]t is more or less clear that, in Slovenia, the consensus about the basic institutions of the rule
of law is still predominantly based on the abstract level and not in the sphere of interpretation
Vol. 72:469, 1997
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It is important to keep this background in mind as you read Professor
Pav~nik's essay. As I see it, what many mainstream American legal
philosophers are inclined to see as a problem with legal
decisionmaking-how to ground it in something outside of its own
performance-Professor Pav~nik's essay portrays as an opportunity. It is
an opportunity for the judges and lawyers of his country to fill the gap
between rule and application35 with a real power (and a real
responsibility) that would help to counterbalance the awesome power
that the non-judicial branches of the state-and private economic
interests, including international big business--can bring to bear on
people, both individually and collectively. Indeed, I can't help thinking
that Professor Pav~nik's essay is not about legal decisionmaking in the
American sense at all, but is rather an exploration of the preconditions,
both logical and psychological, for the emergence of a legal profession
that considers itself a "player" in the construction of a new social,
political, and legal order. And the ethical dimension of Professor
Pav~nik's essay-his relentless insistence on the personal responsibility
that legal decisionmakers bear for their choices-puts me in mind of
Max Weber's advocacy of an "ethic of responsibility" for public
policymakers: an ethic that is inextricably connected to the "knowledge
of tragedy with which all action, but especially political action, is truly
interwoven." '36 But these are just my own interpretations. Putting them
and implementation of these institutions in practice. The coming years will thus show whether
these institutions have been adequately translated into Slovenian legal order, and whether they
have become an essential part of Slovenian legal culture.
34. Recent public opinion research conducted by the Social Science Faculty of the University of
Ljubljana shows that people in Slovenia express a level of trust in the President of the Republic,
the police, the army, educational institutions, and banks that is significantly higher than the level of
trust they express in the courts. Cerar, supra note 2, at 26 (reporting that in 1996 only 24% of
representative sample of 1,050 adults said that they completely or mostly trusted courts, whereas
figures for other institutions just mentioned were: 40% (president), 34% (police), 33% (army), 69%
(educational institutions), and 44% (banks)).
35. Here I am inclined to say, though I doubt that Professor Pav~nik would say it, that the gap
between rule and application is not existential, but is the consequence of a certain way of looking
at legal decisionmaking. It is the picture of a gap-say between X and Y in this sentence-that
underwrites the project of seeing "it" (the gap) as a problem or an opportunity. It is the picture of a
gap, therefore, that has its use in this or that political project.
36. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 77, 117, 120
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958). Compare Weber's remark with Professor
Pavnik's poignant rejection of the idea that decisionmaking consists merely in the establishment
of what is a "completely preexisting solution":
If someone does claim to have knowledge of such a solution, this claim is but a precursor to
the imposition of a particular, and therefore contingent, system of values masquerading as
objectively absolute. Historical experience in Europe and elsewhere has proven that the
479
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all aside, it remains quite clear that in Legal Decisionmaking as a
Responsible Intellectual Activity: A Continental Point cf View we are
hearing the intelligent and subtle voice of a legal philosopher who has
thought long and hard about his subject. We American legal thinkers
would do well to listen closely to voices like his, coming as they do
from a part of the world that is undergoing such profound, and
frequently painful, transformations.
generalized tendency to impose such value systems does not have much in common with
human rights and human dignity.
Pavdnik, supra note 1, at 503.
Vol. 72:469, 1997
